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Chien-peng Chung
Department of Politics and Sociology
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Abstract

Over the last lew yea悶， China has promoted all kinds 01 regional and
cooperation in Asia. However , the extent 01 China 's drive
lor i削itutionalization 01 cooperative regional multilateral processes is
linúted by two realist considerations: 1) Distribution 01 power among
the forum partic伊仰的， and whether the m句ior players are welldisposed towards China or not so and 11) the importance 01 the issues
that the specific lorum is set up to deal with , parti叫 larly to the
political, economic or security interests 01 China， 的t also that olother
participating states
S的 -regional

China has succes功lly pushed lor a high degree 01 institutionalization
with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) because the only
other m可or participant 仰的sia) is a friend, and members haνe a
salie n. t accord in pu叮叮咚 the aims 01 α叫-terrorislη and trade
promotio n. The Six-Party Talks (6P 刃 is minimally institutionalized
because , although the issue 01 nu c/ear disarmament 01 λTorth Korea is
im.p ortant to China , there are many heavy players with their own
agenda in the lorum (U S., Japan , and Russi呵 ， North Korea itself is a
maverick, and the participants have yet to take concrete steps in
resolving many issues pertaining to λTorth Korea giving up its nu c/ear
weapons program. The semi-institutionalized character 01 the ASEAN
+ 3 r可lects the consultative nature 01 the lorum that leaders 01 the
Association 01 Southeast Asian Nations (注 SEAN) and China , Japan and
I This paper was written with the help of my research assistant; Fong Pui Chi. The author
gratefully acknowledges the tinancial support of the Li ngnan University Research and
Postgraduate Studies Committee for the funding of this project. Readers are invited to
share comments on this first draft with the author (cp2chung@LN.edu.hk)

South Korea have decided upon , and competition for injluence between
China and Japa n. To increase cooperation with ASEAN without the
presence of foreign powers , China has worked towards
institutionalizing a separate China-ASEAN axis within the rubric of
ASEAN + 3.

Over the last few years , a major development in international politics
has been the institutionalization of several regional multilateral
processes in Northeast, East and Central Asia, with the People's
Republic of China (PRC) as a prime mover of this developmen t.
Institutionalization helps promote greater international cooperation , but
the process occurs only when actors make a conscious and public
decision to create a specific ruled-based organizational form to
facilitate their cooperation. The potential for institutionalization thus
depends on the actors who are entitled to participate , the distribution of
power held by these actors , their interests in establishing
institutionalized cooperation , and the characteristics of the issue-area to
be addressed ,2 in constituting.a multilateral regime.
A multilateral regime refers to a set of mutual expectations , rules and
regulations , organization plans , efforts and commitments that have
been accepted by a group of states. 3 Multilateral regimes are formed for
the purpose of promoting cooperation among states with shared
interests , establishing expectations of pa位erns of behavior, and
reducing transaction and search costs. 4 Such collective arrangements
are tumed to by states when national objectives cannot be achieved
unilaterally or through bilateral arrangements. It is not necessary for the
constituent states of a regime to share similar values or outlooks ，的
long as they share common policy pu中 oses.

Michael E. Smith , Europe 法 Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of
Cooperatio l1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 2004), 40
3 .I ohn Gerard Ruggie , Constructing the World Polify: Essays on international
institutionalization (London and New York: Routledge , 2002) , 56
4 Robert O. Keohan巴， After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy (Princeton , NJ: Princeton University Press , 1984), 79-95 .
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The most elemental evidence of institutionalization is a clearer
articulation of the functional goals and behavioral norms of the regime.
This usually involves creating a greater number of norms , clarifying
those norms in more detail , changing from informal norms to formal
rules , and bringing more rules and permanent forums into the process. 5
The establishment of a permanent organization to administer some
policy domain represents an additional degree of institutionalization
beyond a decentralized communications network and a set of rules to
guide actors. 6 An organization is thus a relatively stable group of
officials bound by a common purpose , which often extends to concrete
entities with headquarter丸 permanent staffs , budgets , internal
procedures , and other resources that can shape policies or norms. 7
The political scientist Samuel P. Huntington has devised several criteria
for measuring political institutionalization in an organization: 8 1) the
longer an organization has been in existence , the higher the level of
institutionalization. 2) An organization that has survived one or more
changes in its principal functions is more institutionalized than one that
is no t. 3) The more complex an organization is , the more
institutionalized it is. Complexity may involve both multiplication of
organizational subunits , hierarchically and functionally , and
differentiation of separate types of the organizational subunits. 4)
Political institutionalization , in the sense of autonomy , means the
development of political organizations and procedures that are more
than just expressions of the interests of a particular individual , family ,
clan or social group.
The above measurements are yardsticks against which China' s
achievements in institutionalizing regional multilateral regimes in the
Asian region can be appraised. China's invo\vement in constructing
multilateral regimes or institutions reflects not only an aspiration to

Smith , Europe 's Foreign and Security Policy , 38-39
Smith , Europe 's Foreign and Security Policy, 46
7 Smith , Europe 's Foreign and Securify Policy , 46
8 Samuel P. Huntington, Po /i tical Order in Changing Society (N ew Haven and London
Yale University Press , 1968) , 12-20
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shape the rules of the game for regional cooperation , 9 but also its
increasing level of comfort in subscribing to norms of predictable and
interdependent behavior among states. 10 So doing also advances
China's national interest and projects its in f1 uence by raising its
positive profile and dispelling concerns and misgivings about China' s
growing economic and military strengths." Apart from China's rising
power, its expanding diplomatic in f1 uence and increasing activism in
regional multilateral institutions , some of which do not involve the
United States , is recognized as a key development in Asian affairs.
As recently as ten years ago , academic conventional wisdom held that
the government of the PRC conducted its diplomacy at multilateral
economic and security forums in the East Asia-Westem Pacific region
in a tepid manner, and opposed efforts at institutionalizing these forums ,
for fear that giving them structure would constrain its own "national
interests and lead to its sovereignty claims over Taiwan being
questioned.
Between 1997 and 2001 , the Chinese governmen t' s perception of
regional and particularly security-related multilateral organizations
12
evolved from suspicion , to uncertainty , to supportiveness. China's
increasingly positive assessment of regional dialogue groups aríd
organizations principally re f1 ects its evolving recognition that these
institutions are neither intrinsically hostile to China nor potential tools
of the U .S. set on constraining it. 13 China has in fact come to realize
。 Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “Multilateralism in China's ASEAN Policy : lts Evolution,
Characteristics , and Aspiration ," Contemporary Soulheast Asia 27 , nO . l (2005): 119
10 This point was made by Alastair lan Johnston in his chapter on “ Socializati on in
Intemational Institutions: The ASEAN Way and lntemational Relations Theory." in
lnternational Relations Theory and the Asia-Pac拆c， ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael
Mastanduno (N ew York: Columbia University Press、 2003) ， 107-162 . Johnston was
describing China ' s willingness to be "soci aliz巴d " into certain norms adopted by member
states of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) , but the parallel is close enough to be
applied here
11 Wang Jianwei , “ China's Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Mi J1 ennium ," in China
Rising: Power and λ1otivation in Chinese Foreign Policy , ed. Yong Deng and Fei-ling
Wang (La nham Ma: Row man & Littlefield , 2005). 188
12 David Shambaugh , “ China Engages Asia," lnternational Securi紗， Vo l. 29 , No .3
(Winter 2004/05) , 68-69
13 Shambaugh ,

4

that these groupings wish to engage China in the long-term , are open to
Chinese perspectives on preserving sovereignty norms and seeking
cooperative rather than collective security in interstate discourse , and
may even be of use in balancing U.S. power and influence in the region.
Diplomats from the Department of Asian Affairs of the PRC Ministry
of Foreign Affairs who attended various official multilateral forums led
the way in convincing their bureaucratic superiors and national leaders
that China' s cooperation in multilateral settings help reassure others of
its best intentions and avert hostile reactions to its growing power. 14 By
1999-2000 , Chinese intemational affairs experts concluded that for a
peaceful environment conducive to domestic political stability and
economic development to take place , China needed to be more
proactive in shaping its regional environment and pursuing a “ Good
Neighbor Policy." 的
Overcoming traditional nationalistic sensitivities and fears of possible
obstructionist policies being pursued by some foreign countries in
multilateral forums , China's third generation leaders under Jiang Zemin
perceived that China should discharge its responsibilities in
international society commensurate with its status and in f1 uence as a
rising power with one-fifth of the world's population. 16 More than
anything else , this understanding has led to China's late but full-blown
participation in a plethora of regional multilateral organizations.
China's leaders have given multilateral cooperation a prominent place
in its national security doctrine , which envisages the development of a
virtuous cycle of mutual security through cooperative means. China has
since successfully tied its national economic and security interest and
international standing to its promotion of multilateral cooperative
14 Susan L. Shirk , “ China's Multilateral Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific ," U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission ,
Technology Power: Implications for U. S. Economic and Security lnterests ," February 12-

13 ‘ 2004 , 1

Zhu Tingchang, “ Lun Zhongguo mulin zhengce and lilun yu shijian ," (“ On the theory
and practice ofChina's neighborly policy ,") Zhongguo Waijiao (Chinese Foreign -1那rirs) ，
August 2001 :8 , 18
16 Wang Yizhou ,‘ 'Zhongguo yu guoji zuzhi guanxi yanjiu and ruogan wenti ," (“ Several
issues concerning the study of China's involvement with international organizations ,"
Zongguo Waijiao (China 's Foreign Relations) , August 2002: 11 , 51 , 54
15
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strategies and organizations , as a fonn of “ sovereignty enlargement"
and “ extension of nationalism." 17
To convince Asian states that China's rise will not threaten the present
regional order and their national interests , and to use its role and
diplomacy in Asia as a launch pad for greater influence in world affairs ,
China has eagerly promoted all kinds of regional and sub-regional
cooperation in Asia. China is making active and skillful use of regional
multilateral economic and security institutions , such as the ASEAN+ 3
( 10+ 3) / ASEAN + China (10+ 1) , 18 Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) , and Six-Party Talks (6PT) , where PRC officials regularly attend
summit meetings , ministerial conferences , and working conferences , to
accelerate regional integration and cooperation with neighboring states.
ln the process of Asian integration , China is playing the role of the
leading state , or that of the principal facilitator or mediator, with the
support or at least acquiescence ofthe U.S. , Russia , Japan , and ASEAN ,
to further the process of structuralizing or institutionalizing the 6PT ,
SCO and the 10+311 0+ 1.
According to Fu Ying , former Director-General of the PRC Foreign
Ministry's Department of Asian Affairs and current PRC Ambassador
to Australia, China supports de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula
and wiU establish a framework to strengthen regional cooperation with
ASEAN+ 3 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as two key
19
points. The PRC will also ca汀Y out political and security dialogues
and cooperation within the structure of ASEAN+3 , and will continue ω
push for trilateral cooperation involving China, Japan and Korea.
Both the ASEAN+ 3 and ASEAN+ 1 processes have been managed
since the mid -1990s within the same PRC F oreign Ministry apparatus ,
L. V

17 Xiao Chengfeng , “ Revamping China's Multilateral Strategy in East-Asi an Region:
From A New Regionalism Approach," JnterReview (Shanghai Institute of Intemational
Stud ies) 2004 :1, 2
I X In this article , the terms ASEAN+3 and 10+3 are used interchangeably, as are the terms
ASEAN + China, ASEAN+ 1, and 10+ 1, as all tbese terms are invariably used in the
scholarl y literature to refer to these processes
19 Fu Yin g, “ China and ASEAN in a New Era," Chi月a: A n International Journal Yo J. 1
No. 2 (Sep.2003 ): 310-311
20 Fu , “ China and ASEAN in a New Era，'、 31 1.

6

namely , the Division for Regional' Cooperation of the Asian
Departm ent. 21
1n keeping with the measures laid out at the beginning, the degree of
institutionalization of a regional multilateral organization is more or
less collectively determined by an upward index of objectives outlined
and achieved , established norms and procedures or written set of rules ,
presence or size of physical structures or a permanent staff, committees
created , regularity and level of meetings , and longevity. lt is difficult to
address the issue of age , since the organizations under analysis are a11
created within the last ten years. However, not withstanding China's
obvious enthusiasm for helping to establish , develop and structuralize
regional multilateral organizations , it is apparent that the 6PT , 10+3
and SCO reflect low , middle and high levels of institutionalization.
(See Appendix) This is even though the forums have become
progressively institutionalized as the four party talks (4PT) transformed
into the six party talks (6PT) , the Shanghai-5 expanded to become the
SCO , and China's relations with ASEAN consolidated within the 10+3
structure into the 10+ 1.
This paper assert that the extent of China's push for institutionalization
of cooperative regional multilateral processes rests primarily on two
rather realist considerations: I) Distribution of power among the forum
participants, and whether the m吋 or players are well-disposed towards
China or not so and II) the importance of the issues that the specific
forum is set up to deal with , particularly in relation to the political ,
economic or security interests of China, but also that of other
participating states. The process of institutionalizing the 6PT , SCO and
the concurrent 10+311 0+ 1, and the obstacles faced in their structural
development , serves to show up these differences.
This paper could find no support for the popular claims that either
membership size of a multilateral organization affects the degree of
cooperation among its participants , or that China has a certain
preference for institutionalizing economic multilateral forums but not
Kuik , ' ‘ Multilateralism in China' s ASEAN Policy : Its Evolution , Characteristics , and
Aspiration ," 104

21
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security-oriented ones , although it is true that China will not allow the
status of Taiwan to be discussed at any of these forums , which it
considers to be an internal affairs of the Chinese nation. We shall retum
to these two claims at the conclusion.
This study looks at China's involvement in constructing and
institutionalizing regional inter-governmental multilateral regimes or
structures, centered on Asian countries, and aimed at addressing
regional challenges; namely , the 4PT/6PT , Shanghai-5/Shanghai
Cooperation Organization , and ASEAN+ 3/ASEAN+ 1. Reasons why
other multilateral institutions that involve China , such as the Asean
Regional Forum (ARF) , Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ,
or Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) , are excluded from this discussion are
that they are not primarily driven by China, and are really inter-regional
or inter-continental organizations that are largely forums for
discussions and consultative in nature. The interests , concerns and
values of the countries involved are just too diverse for any degree of
institutionalization to occu r. To call the APEC or ARF regional
institutions is really to stretch the term “ regional" to breaking point unless the vast Pacific Ocean is to be considered the heart of a
“ region ," and the ASEM countries are geographically non-contiguous.
Although the U.S. is not geographically part of East Asia, heavy East
Asian trade dependence on the U.S. , plus its network of alliances and
commitments in the region left over from the Cold War , makes it a
power with compelling regional interests and concerns in East Asia.

China's Approaches to the 4PT / 6PT
The 4PT and the subsequent 6PT flowed out ofthe failure to fulfill the
terms of the Framework Accord reached in 1994 between the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, and
the US , under which North Korea would give up its nuclear-weapons
making capabilities , in exchange for fuel oil deliveries fro111 the US and
assistance to build two light-water reactors from Japan and South
Korea. The 4PT between the US , North Korea, China and South Korea
on keeping the Korean peninsula nuclear“ free , held in three preparatory
meetings and six rounds of talks between December 1997 and August
8

1999 , failed largely because North Korea had wanted direct talks with
the US , which was also China's position then , while the US had wanted
to involve at least Japan , if not Russia as well , in the talks , especially if
economic incentives or sanctions were to be considered as options to
induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.
Since the North Korean leadership admitted to visiting US Assistant
Secretary James Kelly in October 2002 that the DPRK was enriching
uranium for nuclear weapons , then expe l1 ed the lnternational Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors who monitored North Korea's
compliance with the Accord , and in January 2003 , withdrew from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) , the US had wanted the
nuclear issue settled tlrrough multilateral diplomacy , while North Korea
wanted to conclude a bilateral non-aggression treaty with the US. By
providing a neutral “ good office ," and brokering a trilateral talk among
the US , DPRK and China in April 2003 , as a compromise for the other
two pm1ies , China played a pivoted role in breaking the standoff. The
US then impressed upon an initially reluctant China the need to host an
expanded series of talks comprising the six parties of the US , China,
North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Russia.
To bring all parties of the proposed 6PT to the table , Chinese diplomats
engaged in a flurry of “ shuttle diplomacy" between Pyongyang ,
Washington , Tokyo , Seoul and Moscow in July 2003. μ As host of the
6PT , the Chinese spared no efforts to cater to the sensibilities of the
negotiating parties. At the Beijing Diaoyutai State Guest House
meeting venue , the six delegations were arranged in an alphabetical
order around a large hexagonal table , with the DPRK diplomats sitting
to the left of the US delegation and opposite the South Korean team. 23
These shuttle and tabular arrangements would be the order of business
for all subsequent 6PTs.
After the second round of talks , China successfully pushed the
participating states to set up a permanent working group of senior
\Vang,“ China's Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium ," 186
Xinhua News Agency,“ Handshakes and Smiling Faces Kick Off Six- Way Talks ," 27
August 2003.

22

23
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officials , 24 and a自er both second and third rounds of talks , China
issued a written Chairman' s Statement. 1n the latest fourth round , host
Beij ing presented a joint document draft for the consideration of the
delegates , but despite having to revise it twice , still could not get it
accepted by all the participants before that round went into recess. 25
Although the 6PT is conducted at the level of the deputy foreign
minister of pat1icipating countries rather than the slightly lower rank of
assistant foreign minister or ambassador at the 4PT , when the fO Ul1h
round went into recess after twelve days of negotiation on 6 August
2005 , the 6PT is sti lI ad hoc or minimally institutionalized because:
•

Although the issue of nu cI ear disarmament of North Korea and
the preservation of a nu cI ear-weapons-free Korean peninsula is
important to China, the participants have yet to agree on what
they should do to induce North Korea to give up its nu cI ear
weapons program.

•

Although China was trusted enough by all participants to host the
6PT , there are many heavy players in the forum with their own
agenda.
North Korea itself is a maverick and no other participant in
the 6PT knows what it wi lI accept to give up its nuclear
weapons program. N 0l1h Korea has demanded US
economic aid , security guarantees and diplomatic
recognition prior to giving any promises of eliminating its
nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang has not agreed to a
th
Chinese draft proposal at the 4 round of the 6PT that
would have required it to give up its entire nu cI ear program ,
even for electricity generation.
US demands “ complete , verifiable and inever吼叫 e"
abandonment of North Korea's highly-enriched uranium
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(HEU) program , as well as its plutonium program , either
for weapons making or electricity generation , before it will
provide that country with the security guarantees , including
diplomatic recognition, that it had asked for. Washington
opposes a peaceful nuclear power program for electricity
generation out of proliferation concerns. 26
Japan wants to include human rights and past cases of
abduction of Japanese citizens to North Korea in 6PT
discussions.
China considers North Korea a buffer state against US
forces in South Korea and does not wish to see the collapse
of the Kim Jong-il regime as a result of US coercive action
on North Korea.
South Korea has indicated that it is willing to supply the
North with all of its electricity , and both Russia and China
promised more economic aid , if Pyongyang pledges to give
up its nuclear weapons program.
China's leverage is by far the greatest because it is the
major provider of food and fuel to the ma叫l 抗扣伽m肌
lction
叫
nm
economy of No叫rt出h Korea. China , Russia and South Korea
are against economic sanctions or military strikes against
North Korea to coerce it into giving up its nuclear power
program.

.

26

The Chinese , together with the Koreans , have strong memories of
Japanese imperialism and its atrocities , and oppose the use of the
N orth Korean nuclear issue or tenorism as a means for the
Japanese government to justi方 an increased role for Japan's SelfDefense F orces in regional security and international

Associated Press , “New draft of joiot statement proposed at 6-pal1y talks ,"

Jnternational HeraZd Tribune , 1 August 2005
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peacekeeping activiti_es , as well as any augmentation of its
military capabilities.
':'1

•

Even though China and the U.S. share the objective of a nuclear
weapons-free Korean Peninsula, the interests and policies of
China and the U.S. diverge across a number of important regional
issues , notably U.S. arms sales to Taiwan , and China's
increasingly warm ties with ASEAN , Russia, and South Korea.
China is now the largest trading partner of South Korea, a U.S.
a l1 y , and the strong state of bilateral ties has been a key factor in
forging the 6PT , as Beijing has been closely coordinating its
position with Seoul in the talks. 28

After the fO U1ih round of talks resumed on 13 September 2005 , the
PRC presented the delegates with another draft, which was debated
upon and accepted after six days. In the final Joint Statement, North
Korea agreed in principle to halt its nuclear-weapons program , rejoin
the NPT , and allow IAEA inspectors back into the country , while the
US gave an assurance not to attack North Korea, and the other five
countries promised to provide an unspecified amount of energy aid to
North Korea. 29 lssues such as the peaceful use of nuclear energy by
North Korea and the normalization of its relations with US and Japan
are left for future discussions. Based on past behavior, there is every
possibility that North Korea might renege on the dea 1. 30 To implement
the commitments agreed upon, and work out remaining differences,
further rounds of the 6PT will have to be held.

China's Approaches to the 10+3/10+1
The 10+3 forum was instituted when the leaders of China , Japan and
South Korea met as a group with their counterp a1is from the 10
Shambaugh , “ China Engages Asia," 93 .
Shambaugh , “ China Engages Asia," 80
29 Reuters , “ Nuclear Pact on shaky foundations ," South China Morning Post , 20
Se ptember 2005
30 Jae-soon Chang , “ North Korea Oemands Nuke Reactor From U.S .," Associated Press ,
19 September 2005

27

28
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countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in
Kuala Lumpur in December 1997 amidst the Asian financial crisis. The
leaders issued their first “ Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation"
at the third 10+3 Summit held in Manila in November 1999 , and set in
motion a series of meetings between the foreign , finance and economic
ministers of the grouping-3l
As the original goal of the grouping was to stabilize East Asia' s
economies after the Asian crisis , the finance ministers of a11 10+3 states
came together in the Thai city of Chiang Mai in 1999 to work out a
regional cu叮ency-swap mechanism , by which the thirteen countries
would lend one another part of their hard currency reserves if any of
their cu n-encies came under speculative pressure. The financial crisis
which inspired the Chiang Mai lnitiative led to a series of meetings that
in turn developed trust among the 10+3 countries. China enhanced its
reputation in the region by maintaining the value of its currency and
contributing to the lnternational Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue package
for Thailand.
At the 6 1h ASEAN+ 3 Summit held in Phnom Penh on 4 November
2002 , China announced that it would waive a11 or most of the debt
owed to it by Vietnam , Laos , Cambodia and Burma. By acting
responsibly in not devaluing its cun- ency , as widely feared , and by
offering aid packages and low-interest loans to several Southeast Asian
countries , the PRC government did much to replace the image of China
as aloof or arrogant w ith one of China as a helpful neighbor and
responsible power , and the welcomed response bo~sted the confidence
of China' s leaders in their roles as regional actors.
..J"<

China' s interest in institutionalizing regional multilateral processes in
Asia coincides w ith , and is propelled by , the substantial intensification
of intra-regional trade and investment within the last two decades and
the growth of regional production networks and supply chains centered

Oav id Capie , “ Ri val Regions? East Asian Regionali sm and its Challenge to the Asiain Asia Pacifì c: A Regiu l1 in Transitiol1 , ed. .T ames Rolfe (Asia-Pacific Center of
Security Studies , Honolulu , Hawa ii 、 2 004 ) 152
32 Shambaugh, "China Engages As ia ," 68

31
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tìrst on Japan , 'and increasingly on China. 33 Asian leaders have been
given a strong incentive , especiaIIy since the 1990s, to pursue closer
relations to give the region balance against the possible development of
exclusive blocs elsewhere , particularly in Europe and North America. 34
The stronger than expected growth of China and the recovery and
strengthening of foreign direct investment between ASEAN and the
other three countries are also significant forces in consolidating the
grouping. 35 There are also arguments increasingly made by East Asians
that the region needs to develop a regional identity to balance the
influence of the U.S. in Asia, increase its weight in the world and have
a stronger voice in global tìnancial and trade institutions. 36 These
material and ideational vectors for Asian regionalism have , if anything,
become more salient as time passes.
China has supported the formation of the East Asian Vision Group of
academics in 1999, which came up with the blueprint report “ Towards
an East Asian Community刊 in 2002. China has also taken the initiative
to push for the creation of a Network of East Asia Think-Tanks
(NEAT). 37In November2001 , a group of experts a-Om member states
of the ASEAN+ 3 presented a proposal to their leaders caIIing not only
for trade and tìnancial liberalization , but also for strengthened
cooperation in the political , security , social and cultural fields to create
a regional community.38 At the 10+3 summit in 2002 , China suggested
that the ASEAN+ 3 process be expanded to include regional political
33 Paul Evans , “ Nascent Asian regionalism and lts Implications for Canada咱們 unpubli s hed
manuscript prepared for the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada's Roundtable on the
Forei gn Policy Dialogue and Canada-Asia Relations , 4. According to Evans , while intraAsian trade in the early 1980s was about 25% of all trade conducted by Asian countries ,
twenty y闊的 later, the fi gure had exceeded 50%
34 Capie , ' ‘ Rival Regions? East Asian Regionalism and its Challenge to the Asia-Pacific ,"
155
35 Tran Van Hoa, Globalization , Crises and the Emergence of New Asian Regionalism
Genesis and Current Development," in New Asian regionalism: Re!Jp onses 10
Globalization, ed. Tran Van Hoa and Char1 es Harvie (Gordonsville , VA: Palgrave
McMillan司 2 004) ， 12-13
36 Evans , ' ‘ Nascent Asian regionalism and Jts lmplications for Canada," 5
37 Kuik , '‘ Multilateralism in China's ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution , Characteristics , and
Aspiration," 116
38 Dirk Nabers、 “The Social Construction of intemational institutions: the case of
ASEAN+3 ," Jnternational Relations of the Asia-Pacific , February L 2003; 3:1 ， 1 2 0、 13 2
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and security issues such as combating terrorism and other trans-national
39
crime. Since then , ASEAN+3 has evolved into something much more
complex , including the promotion of confidence-building measures and
traditional and non-traditional security in the region. 40 At the
ASEAN+3 Summit in October 2003 , PRC Premier Wen Jiabao
formally enunciated a “ Good Neighbor Policy" for China specifically
directed toward its Asian neighbors , which it had already been
practicing since the 1980s , albeit then on a largely bilateral basis , and
indicated that China is fully amendable to the “ASEAN Way" of
incremental consensus building and group decision-making. Lately ,
South Korea has proposed creating an integrated ASEAN+ 3 “ egovernment center" in Seoul in 2006 to act as a bridge to smooth
exchanges in such fields as human resources , technical suppo此，
41
education and training , a move that is supported by China.
On the verge of consolidating a distinct regional identity as the East
Asian Community , ASEAN+3 promises much and is displaying signs
of institutional consolidation. There are current1y 48 dialogue
mechanisms under the 10+3 process , coordinating 16 areas of
cooperation , which include economics , finance , foreign affairs , politics ,
security , labor, health , tourism , environment , agriculture , forestry ,
social welfare , energy , transnational crime , information and
communications technology (I CT) and youth affairs. By April 2005 , 16
bilateral cu訂ency swap arrangements have been signed under the
Chiang Mai Initiative , amounting to US$37.5 billion , although this
represents only a mere fraction of the combined foreign exchange
42
reserves of around US$2.5 trillion at the disposal of East Asian states.

Joi nt Communiqué of the First ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on
Transnational
Crime
(AMMTC+3)
8angkok,
10
January
2004;
39

ilttp ://www.asean s ec.or~/ 15 645 . htm

Nabers. "The Social Construction of intemational institutions: the case of ASEAN+3 ,"
126
41 Xinhua News Agency ,“ ASEAN Plus Three e-government center likel y to be set up in
Seoul ," May 26. 2005
42 Chr甘心pher M. Dent , “ Taiwan and the New Regional Political Economy of East Asia ,"
China Quarter妝， 182 , May 2005 , 390-391
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However , despite talks of setting up a free trade area, an Asian Bonds
Market that would issue bonds denominated in local cunencies ,43 and
an Asian Monetary Fund type of financial arrangement ,44 the grouping
has arguably delivered relatively little so far.的 Although there are
regular meetings of 10+3 leaders , ministers , and senior officials , and
documents to set and record the agenda of these meetings , there is no
secretariat, permanent staff, binding agreement , or written set of rules
to structure the grouping.
The semi-institutionalized character of the 10+3 principally re f1 ects
several factors:

.

The preference exhibited by the leaders and ministers of the 10
ASEAN countries and China , Japan and South Korea for
maintaining the consensual-building approach of the forum and
non-binding nature of understandings reached - the fabled
“ ASEAN Way" 一 to avoid or minimize open con f1 ict.

•

Except for Malaysia's erstwhile Prime Minister, Mahathir
Mohammed , almost a11 the other leaders of ASEAN were not in
favor of creating a separate 10+3 secretariat,46 for fear of diluting
ASEAN's own in f1 uence within the enlarged grouping , but
consented to the establishment of a 10+3 Unit within the existing
ASEAN Secretariat in December 2003 to coordinate and monitor
10+3 cooperation.

•

China's proposal at the sixth 10+3 Summit in November 2002 ,
which suggested that the 10+3 process be expanded from
economic cooperation to include regional political and security

的 Dent， “Taiwan and the New Regional Political Economy of East Asia，叫 392
44 Nabers , “ The Social Construction of international institutions : the case of ASEAN+3 ,"
130
的 Mark Beeson , “ ASEAN Plus Three and the Rise of Reactionary Regionalism ,"
Contempor01y Soulheast Asia, Volume 25 , Number 2 , August 2003 , 264 .
46 Alice D. Ba司“The Politics and Economics of ‘ East Asia ' in ASEAN-China Relations ,"
in China and Soulheasl Asia、 ed . Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C. Y. Ku (lnstitute of
Southeast Asian Studies , Singapore, 2005) , 181
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issues such as combating tetrorism and other trans-national crime ,
may actually have diffused the focus of the process.
•

Even though the 10+3 countries have developed a non-traditional
security agenda for cooperation and consultation , to address
“piracy , drug-trafficking , illegal migration , smuggling of small
arms , money laundering, cyber crime , international terrorism and
other issues affecting human security，"的 they have been very
cautious about expanding cooperation or even discussion beyond
a non-traditional security agenda , for fear of provoking US
concerns that it will tum into an institution that provides China
with a vehicle to dominate East Asian politics and undermine US
presence and interest in the region.

•

Head-to-head competition for in f1 uence in Southeast Asia
between China and J apan , and J apan' s refusal so far to acquiesce
in China's leadership in the 10+3.
One ofthe main reasons for Japan's participation in 10+3 is
to balance or dilute the inf1 uence of China in Southeast
Asia, which Japan has for decades considered to be its
investment destination , export platform , and resource area.
By aggressively pursuing a strong China-ASEAN axis
within the 10+3 since the 2001 to establish a free trade area
(FTA) between China and ASEAN , China has triggered
strong competition between itself and Japan for in f1 uence in
Southeast Asia. 4 8 Observers widely see the Japanese
govemment' s decision to set up a study group to look into
the conclusion of a “ closer economic partnership" with
ASEAN as a belated a仕empt to compete and catch up with
China' s proposal for the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area.

‘'T owards an East As ian Community: Re gion of Peace , Prosperity and Progress ," East
As ian Vi sion Group (EA YG) Report (2002 ), 21
48 Markus Hund , “ ASEAN Plus Three: towards a new age of pan-Asian reg ionalism? A
skeptic ‘ s apprai sal ," Pac!戶c Review , Vo J. 16 , No. 3 , 2003 , 41 1. Richard Stubbs, ' ‘ Asean
Plus Three : Emerging Asian R egionalism?" Asian Survey , Vol XL口 ， No . 3 , MaylJ une
2002 , 45 2

47
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J apan is seeking cooperation with 10+3 countries , but
because of its imp Oltant trade and investment links with the
US and western countries , wants to prevent the forum from
integrating into an exclusionary economic bloc , and desires
an East Asian “ community" of nations that would include
10+3 countries as well as Australia, New Zealand, and even
India. 49
Japan launched an initiative to set up an Asian Monetary
Fund in the midst of the Asian crisis as a lender of last
resort to affected countries , but quickly retracted the idea
once the U.S. objected to it as an avenue to circumvent
International Monetary Fund conditionality. Japan desires
to act as the leader of the region, yet it tries to do nothing
within or without the 10+3 that might earn it the
disapproval of the U.S. government and harm their close
bilateral economic relations and security alliance.
To increase across-the-board and yet more concrete cooperation with
ASEAN without the presence of a potentially obstructionist foreign
power , and to some extent, marginalize Taiwan's diplomatic and
economic involvement with Southeast Asian states , China has worked
toward institutionalizing a separate China-ASEAN 10+ 1 axis within the
rubric of 10+3. Within 10+ 1, China is taking the leading role in subregional integration with Southeast Asia, with strengthening economic
ties laying a solid foundation for political , security and other functional
relationships between China and ASEAN. China is pushing
institutionalization of the 10+ 1 along the “ ASEAN Way ," at a pace that
both China and ASEAN countries are comfortable with.
10+ 1 has as its genesis the first China-ASEAN Senior Officials'
Meeting (SOM) at Hangzhou , China, in April 1995. Despite Beijing's
initial reluctance to discuss disputes about sovereignty and jurisdiction
in the South China Sea, following the PLA occupation of the disputed
Mischief Reef, Chinese senior officials agreed to informal discussions
on the Spratlys at the first China-ASEAN SOM , and accepted that this
的 Hund，“ASEAN Plus Three: towards a new age ofpan-Asian regionalism?" 394 , 401
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lssue WO叫 d be broached and tabled in subsequent China-ASEAN
50
meetings. At the second China-ASEAN SOM in June 1996 , Beijing
avowed the norms of restraint , non-use of force , and peaceful
settlement of conflict. 51
The China-ASEAN dialogue was instituted in July 1996. There are five
parallel mechanisms that form the overall structure of the ASEANChina dialogue. They are the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation
Commi仕ee
(ACJCC) , ASEAN-China Senior Officials Political
Consultations , ASEAN-China Joint Committee on Economic and Trade
Cooperation , ASEAN-China Joint Science and Technology Committee ,
and ASEAN Committee in Beij ing. Inaugurated in F ebruary 1997 , the
ACJCC acts as the coordinator of all ASEAN-China dialogue
mechanisms at the working group level , 52 and manage the small
ASEAN-China Co-operative Fund which finances studies for joint
projects. Oecember 1997 witnessed China's attendance at the first
informal China-ASEAN summi t.
At their summit in 2002 , China and ASEAN signed four key
agreements: The Oeclaration on Conduct (OOC) in the South China
Sea; the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation and Establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area;
the Joint Oeclaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional
Security Issues; and the Memorandum of Understanding on
Agricultural Cooperation.
With the OOC , Beijing reaffirmed the norms of restraint , non-use of
force , and peaceful settlement of conflict in handling its disputes with
other claimants over the South China Sea islands. The Sino-ASEAN
Economic Agreement in 2002 aims to build a China-ASEAN Free
Trade Area (CAFT A) by 2010. A patiicularly enticing aspect of the
Agricultural Memorandum to Cambodia, Laos , Vietnam and Myanmar
50 Jurgen Haacke , Aseon 's diplomotic ond security culture, origins , development ond
p ro:, pects (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon 2003 ,) 125
5 1 Haacke , Aseon 's diplomotic ond security culture , 129
52 AS EAN Secretariat,“The First Meeting of the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation
Co mmittee : Beijing , 29-28 February 1997 , Jo int Press Release ," ASEAN Economic
Bulle t巾， Jul y 1997 , 87
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is its "Early Harvest" provision , by which China undertakes to extend
preferential tariff and other treatments to the agricultural , fruit and meat
imports of these countries immediately without expectation of
reciprocity for five years. The Joint Declaration on Non-traditional
Security aims to promote cooperation in combating cross-border drug
smuggling , human trafficking , money-laundering, spread of epidemics ,
and terrorist activities.
Under the 10+ 1 mechanism , China has identified five important areas
for cooperation , in agriculture , information technology , human resource
development, mutual economic investments , and development of the
Mekong River Basin. Accordingly , since 2002 , a tri-annual summit has
been held among heads of government and business leaders from China ,
Thailand , Laos , Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar , countries
connected by the river , on the development of the highways , railways
and custom services linking the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) ,
and the PRC government has backed soft loans to Chinese business
interests in the Mekong region. 53 Trade between China and the other
GMS countries totaled US$ 25.82 billion in 2004. 54
h

At the i China-ASEAN summit in Bali , Indonesia , held on 8 October
2003 , China entered into a strategic patinership agreement with
ASEAN , and became the first non-ASEAN state to formally accede to
ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) , which commits
China to respecting the principles of nonaggression and noninterference in the domestic affairs of signatory states.
Although a number of ASEAN states actually compete directly with
China in terms of low-wage labor-intensive export manufacturing
industries , J_' China is a vast marketplace for ASEAN produce , and
ASEAN leaders and business persons generally perceive China and the
proposed CAFT A to be much more as an opportunity than as a threat.

Clarissa Oon ,“ Beijing to spur investment with soft loans ," Slraits Times (Singapore) , 5
July 2005 , 9
54 Xinhua, "Ministry of Commerce outlines measures for promoting GMS Co-op ,"
http ://engl ish.sina.com/business/ 1I2005 /0703/370 18 .html
55 Stubbs、“Asean Plus Three ," 452
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56

Trade between China and ASEAN reached US$ 105.8 billion in 2004.
lt has been said that,“ASEAN countries have realized that China has
already become the fastest engine of Asia' s economies , and whoever
gets on this locomotive wiII have a bright future. ,, 57 China has carried a
trade deficit with ASEAN as a whole for the past five years. Unlike
during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s , with the
improvement in the ASEAN economies , diversion of foreign direct
investments (FDI) from Southeast Asia to China is no longer much of
an lssue.
The political initiative to promote regional stability and coordinate
economic policies in East Asia seems to come mostly from China，的 it
will be difficult for Japan to make its weight felt as long as its economy
remains more or less stagnant，的 it has been for most of the last fifteen
years. Still , neither 10+3 nor 10+ 1 has yet to establish specific rules or
58
the mechanisms to enforce the common objectives of member-states.
China's sheer size , its authoritarian political structure , and its history of
hegemonic a位empts over parts of Southeast Asia , together with the
unresolved claims to the South China Sea islands , also make it hard to
dispel the unease that Southeast Asian countries have toward China.
China's activism in a multilateral setting is a reassuring signal to its
neighbors , but not a guarantee of future non-a"g gressive actions.

China's Approaches to the Shanghai-5 / SCO
After the fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991 , the primary concerns of
the Russia , China, and the new states of Central Asia - Kazakhstan ,
Kyrgyzstan , Tajikistan , Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan - have
progressively shifted from demarcating boundaries to promoting border
security to establishing regional confidence-building measures to
combating what regional policy makers have termed the “ three evils"
一 Oon‘“ Beijing to spur investment with soft loans."

Hou Songling and Chi Diantan 巨， “ Dongnanya yu zhongya: Zhongguo zai xinshiji de
di yuan zhanlue xuanze ，刊 (“ Southeast Asia and Central Asia: China 's geo-political
strategic choice in the new century," ) Zongguo Waijiao ( Chi月。 's Foreign Affoil吟，
August 2003: 8, 28
5R Shir k, "China ‘ s Multilateral Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific ," 5
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of terrorism , religious extremism and secessionism. To address these
transnational issues and cha11enges , Russia , China and the Central
Asian states of Kazakhstan , Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan decided to
create a regional multilateral forum dubbed the Shanghai-Five - socalled because the first meeting of the heads of state of the grouping
took place in China' s Shanghai on the 26 April 1996. S ince June 2001 ,
with the admission of Uzbekistan into the grouping, its name was
changed to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO
has in recent years added to its core focus of fighting the “ three evils"
by advancing cooperation in the fields of interdicting a11 forms of crossborder smuggling and promoting economic interaction among member
states.
The SCO , and its predecessor , the Shanghai-5 , is the first multilateral
security organization largely initiated and promoted by China. The
SCO looks we11-institutionalized , as seen from the structure of its
organization. 59
On 15 June 2001 , the day on which the SCO was founded in Shanghai ,
‘ Shanghai Convention against Terrorism , Separatism and
(Religious) Extremism' was signed by leaders of the member states ,
clearly defining the cardinal purpose of the organization. China' s main
goal is to gain the cooperation of Central Asian governments to reduce
the threat ofMuslim Uighur separatism in Xi njiang.

吐le

The SCO Charter, which provides the purposes , principles , structure
and operational rules of the organization, by laying a legal foundation
for its growth , 60 was adopted by the heads of SCO states meeting in St.
Petersburg in June 2002.
The supreme decision-making body of the SCO is the Council of Heads
of States. It holds regular sessions once a year and makes decision and
issues instructions on a11 important matters pertaining to the
orgal1l Zat lO n.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Website ,
l11tp://v.'ww.sectsco.org/aeticle.asp?id temp2= I &Langua!!eID=~(Last accessed 1 September 2005)
60 Wang, “ China's Multilatera1 DipJomacy in the New Millennium ," 182
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Below this level of meeting, the Council of Heads of Government has
held regular meetings once a year since September 2001 to discuss
strategies of multilateral cooperation and priorities for the organization ,
as weIl as to approve the budget for the following year.
Lower down , there exists the mechanism of annual meetings of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs , Economy , Transpo此， Culture , Defence ,
Law Enforcement; Heads of Department on
Extreme Measures
(disaster coordination) , and General Public Prosecutors.
SCO functions are coordinated by a Council of National Coordinators
of SCO member states meeting at least three times a year , and joint
working groups under the charge of senior officials in the relevant
ministries of member states have been established to tackle issues of
common concem.
61

The SCO has two permanent bodies : 1) The SCO Secretariat, located
in Beiji峙， consists of 30 people delegated by the member countries in
proportion to their financial contribution to the SCO budget. The
Secretariat works closely with the Council of National Coordinators in
preparing drafts , making suggestions , implementing resolutions , and
exercising budgetary supervision for the organization. 62 The largest
contingent of delegates is 台om the PRC. 2) The Regional AntiTerrorist Structure (RA TS) in Tashken t. The Secretariat was
inaugurated on 15 January 2004 and the 1st meeting of RA TS
Executive Committee was on 31 October 2003. The combine budget
for both the Secretariat and the RA TS came to $3.5 million in 2004 ,
with China and Russia each paying 24 0/0 of it.的

Nev.'s Agency、 Moscow， in Russian 0315 , "Russian diplomat appointed deputy
CEO of Shanghai Cooperation Organization ," BBC MonÍtoring Former Soviet UnÍon , 15
January 2004 ‘ l
62 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization website ,
l1 1t p:llwvvw.sectsco.or g/aeticle.asp?id temp2= 1&Language !D =2JLast accessed I Septem b巴r 2005)
的 X inhua News Agency台“ SCO Major Force in Jnternational Counter-terrorism ," 16
January 2004
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Both the SCO Executive Secretary and the RA TS Executive Committee
Director are appointed by the Council of Heads of States for a period of
three ye訂 s. The first SCO Secretary-General is China's Zhang
Deguang , and the first Director of RA TS is Vyacheslav Kasymov from
Uzbekistan. Members take turns according to the Russian alphabetical
order of their country's name to serve a three year term. The Secretary
is assisted by three deputies in charge of political-security , economichumanitarian , and administrative-legal-budget affairs , and an assistant
secretary in charge of external and media relations. 64
What accounts for the high degree of institutionalization in the SCO
structure in the relatively short period of 5 years since it was formed?

.

The process of institutionalization was already started under the
predecessor ofthe SCO , the Shanghai-Five forum.
The “ Shanghai-5" mechanism for boundary demarcations
and confidence-building between the head of state of China,
and those of Russia, Kazakhstan , T吋 ikistan and
Kyrgyzstan , was established with the holding of its first
summit in Shanghai on 26 April 1996. On 26 April 1997 ,
heads of the five countries held a second meeting in
Moscow and signed the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of
Military Forces along China's borders with Kazakhstan ,
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
At the third summit in Kazakhstan's Almaty on 3 July 1998 ,
discussions expanded into non-border issues such as
cooperation against their common threat of terrorism ,
religious fundamentalism , and separatism, which soon
became the focus of the Shanghai-5 and subsequently the
SCO. At the fomih summit in Kyrgyzstan ' s Bishkek on 24
August 1999, the group agreed to institute constant
meetings between officials of various government
depm1ments in member-states.

“ The Shanghai Cooperation Organization website,

http ://www.sectsco.or g/aI1i cle.asp? id temp2= 1&Lan guage lD =L(Last a郎郎sed I September 2005)
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1n November 1999, the heads of law enforcement agencies
among the Shanghai-5 countries met for the first time. The
first meeting of defence ministers of the group was held in
Kazakhstan's Astana in March 29-30 , 2000. The first
meeting ofthe group's foreign ministers was held on 5 July
2000 , just before the fifth Summit at Tajikistan's Dushanbe.
The Dushanbe Summit mooted the idea of establishing a
Shanghai-5 Council of National Coordinators to foster
regularized coordination for organizational support, which
was realized under the SCO. These set of important
meetings would become annualized and institutionalized
when the Shanghai-5 became the SCO the following year ,
with the addition ofUzbekistan.

“

•

The operating principles of the SCO are under girded by shared
norms and interests among its member states.
Although the Shanghai-5 / SCO has stated that it is not a
military alliance directed against any external parties , 66
both leadership of China and Russia has been united in a
strategic partnership since 1996 against what they see as
“ hegemonism" and "unipolarity."
Being newly-independent, Central Asian countries desired
international atlention and recognition , the support of
Russia and China to help them fight Islamic fundamentalist
terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan and the Hizb-ut- Tahr汀， and a reduction of their
trade dependence on Russia , and these aims could be
achieved in part through joining up with China first in the
Shanghai-5 and subsequently the SCO. Even after the
overthrow of President Askar Akayev , the new leadership
of Kyrgyzstan apparently saw enough value in the SCO

(, 5 Andrei Kiriilov, “ Chi Haotian hails Shanghai Five military cooperation ," ITAR-T ASS
Ne ws Wire. April3 , 2001 , 1
66 Xu Tao,“Lun Shanghai hezuo zuzhi de jizhihua," (“On the institutionalization of the
Shanghai Cooperati on Organization,") International Politics (China), 2003 : 10, 1
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such that it did not even contemplate withdrawing from the
orgamzat lO n.
The Dushanbe Declaration issued at the closed of the fifth
summit of Shanghai-5 leaders on July 5, 2000 , confirmed
the right of each state to choose its own path of political,
economic , and public policy development, declared against
intervention into the internal affairs of other states under
the pretext of “ humanitarian intervention" and “ human
rights protection," and support efforts by member states to
protect the independence , sovereignty , territorial integrity
and social stability of member states. 67 This declaration,
more than any other document, defines the norms of the
Shanghai-5 forum and the succeeding SCO.
At the time that the SCO was founded , member states
quickly set about planning for the organization a flag and
emblem, permanent secretariat, regional anti-terrorist
structure , and budget. 68
Cooperation among governments against terrorism,
religious fundamentalism , and separatism has remained the
focus of the SCO , although it has expanded to economic
cooperation in the form of encouraging trade , investment
and infrastructural development among member countries
since the 2003 SCO summit at Moscow , and the crackdown
on the trafficking of illicit arms , ammunition, explosives ,
and particularly narcotics， 的 as well as organized
international crime , illegal immigration and mercenary
activities; 70 since the 2004 summit at Tashken t.
的 ITAR-TASS News Wi悶，“approve of special services cooperation ," July 5, 2000
68
A. Lukin‘ “Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Problems and Prospects ,"
Jnternational Affairs (Russia) , 50 , no.3 (2004) , 34
69
Hua Yujie , " Shanghai hexuo zuzhi: dique anquan yu jingji jinbu ," (“ Shanghai
Cooperation Organization: regional security and economic progress ,") Jnternafional
Politics (China)、 2005 : 4 ， 90-91
70
Xinhua News Agency , “ SCO pledges to deal w ith new security challenges ," Chil1 a
Daily , 6 July 2005
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The joint declaration at the end of the July 2005 SCO
summit at Kazakhstan' s capital Astana called for a timetable for the withdrawal of US-led anti-terrorist forces in
Afghanistan , and for a deadline to end the use of temporary
facilities and their military contingents' presence in SCO
countries , citing the end of large-scale operations against
terrorism in Afghanistan. 71 In the aftermath of the
September 11 , 2001 attacks on the US , two SCO countries ,
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan , provided air-base facilities for
use by the US military in its actions against the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan , which the US has accused of
harboring the master-minds of the 9-11 attacks.
Accordingly , the Uzbek govemment gave U.S. forces 180
days from 29 July 2005 to evict its Karshi-Khanabad air
base. 72
According to SCO Secretary-General Zhang , the
organization has initiated 120 projects concerning customs
cooperation , cross-border transp Oliation , laws and
73
regulation coherence , energy , and railway construction.
The organization has set itself the goal of realizing the free
f1 0w of goods , services , capital and technology within a
74
twenty-year time frame from 2005.

.

The driving force of the SCO is clearly China , as it is an obvious
tool for enhancing Chinese power and in f1 uence in the region.
China's main goals are to stabilize the region , which is
turning out to be a potentially imp Oliant source of oil and
gas for its growing economy , and to get the support of
Central Asian governments in its fight against U ighur

Hu Qihua , "SCO summit f1 exes anti-terror muscles ," China Daily , 8 August 2005
Jim Garamone,“ Uzbeks ask U.S. to leave Karshi-Khanabad ," AFP ( 執lashin t，r1:on) ， 1
J\ ugust 2005
I j Xinhua News Agency ,“ SCO summit starts to push for closer regional coopel訓 ion ，"
Peoples ' Daily (English Edition) , 5 July 2005
74 Xinhua News Agency ,“ SCO summit starts to push for c1 0ser regional cooperation ,"
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separatists to deny them cross-border funding , equipment
or sanctuary. Jiang Zemin became the first PRC Head of
State to visit Central Asia in 1996. 75 Since then, either the
president or prime minister of China has visited the region
at least once a year.
To avoid the SCO from being sidelined by the post 9-11
US military presence in Central Asia, Beijing pushed hard
for the institutionalization of a regional anti-terrorist center
at the 2002 St. Petersburg summi t. 76 At that summit, China
managed to pressure the group into taking a stand against
the deployment of the theatre missile defense (TMD) , for
such a US missile shield would make China's relatively
small nuclear deterrent force obsolete.
Re f1 ecting China's goal of building comprehensive
strategic partnerships , at its 2003 annual meeting in
Moscow , the SCO expanded its focus from primarily
counterterrorism to economic cooperation. 77 The Chinese
president made a strong push for an early focus on building
transport infrastructure throughout Eurasia. 78
The joint military exercise between Chinese and Kyrgyz
forces in October 2002 , and the joint “ anti-terrorist"
exercise of SCO militaries at the Chinese-Kazakh border in
August 2003 effectively tums the grouping into a quasimilitary bloc. When China and Russia engaged in their first
joint military exercise in August 2005 , only observers from
other SCO member states were allowed.
Further reflecting China's instrumental role and influence ,
a permanent secretariat largely funded by the PRC was
Zhu , “ Lun Zhongguo mulin zhengce and lilun yu shijian ," (“ On the theory and practice
of China' s neighborly policy ,") 18
76 Xinhua Ne~s Agency , “ Jiang Zemin Calls for Regional Anti -terrorism Mechanism
between SCO ," January 7 , 2001 ,
77 Shambaugh , “ China Engages Asia ," 74
78 ‘ Hu Jintao ' s Speech at the SCO Moscow Summit ," People 旨 Dai妙， May 30 , 2003
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created in Beijing in late 2003 , 79 and where the PRC
maintains the largest number of staff members. China's
Zhang Deguang, former ambassador to Russia , became the
first SCO Secretary-General.
Ahead of the 2005 SCO summit at Astana, China ' s
President H u Jintao separately forged a strategic
partnership with Kazakhstan 's President Nursultan
Nazarbayev , pledging to support Kazakhstan's entry into
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in exchange for a
commitment from the latter to help it counter a口empts by
Xinjiang's Islamic rebels to seek sanctuary in
xo
Kazakhstan. Beijing would also like the Kazakh leader to
guarantee delivery of the mutually agreed upon amount of
oil and gas through the pipelines which the Chinese are
building across his country.
Hu said that China would set aside a special fund for the
training of 1500 people from other SCO countries within
the next three years , 81 chie f1 y in the areas of economic ,
scientific-technical and humanitarian cooperation.
China implicitly condoned the harsh actions of Uzbekistan
President Ismail Karimov in putting down protests in
Andijan , eastern Uzbekistan , in May 2005 , with SCO
Secretary Zhang from China calling the disturbance “ a
terror attack carried out by armed religious extremists." “
When Russia suggested admitting India as an observer,
China agreed only if Pakistan and Iran were also admitted

Louisa Lim,“China and Central Asia Boost Ties ," BBC News World Edition ,
September 24 , 2003 ‘ l1tto ://nevvs.bbc.co. ukl l /hi /world/asia-oaci fìc/3130852.stm
的 Go h Sui Noi ‘ “ Security summit will aJso discuss economic ties，叫 Straits Times
(Singapore). 5 Jul y 2005
81 Xinhua News Agency , '‘ Hu: SCO 扣ture hinges on action." 6 JuJ y 2005
82 Goh ,“ Security summit will aJso discuss economic ties ."
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as observers at the same time. 83 Hence ,. Iran, Pakistan and
lndia became observer members of the SCO at its 2005
summit, joining Mongolia, which was admitted to observer
status the year before. The close relationship between
China, Russia and Iran may prove to become a major
obstacle to American policy in the Central Asian region.
Given China's dedication to developing the SCO , the only way in
which the SCO can fail is if Russia and a majority of its Central Asian
members perceive that it is no longer in their interest to stay in the
organization , but the SCO has so far remained intact despite one
unconstitutional change in the leadership of a constituent state , albeit a
small one. This is due not to the fear of displeasing China by
withdrawing from the organization, but rather to the shared norms and
interests that member states have , and in the greatest likelihood , to the
high level of institutionalization exhibited by the SCO , constituting a
thickening web of regularized engagement and multiplying issues
within which the member states are enmeshed.

Conclusion
The record of China' s a吐empts at institutionalizing regional
multilateral organizations is uneven. China has successfully pushed for
a high degree of institutionalization with the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) because the only other m司 or participant (Russia)
is a friend , and members have a salient accord in pursuing the aims of
anti-telTorism and trade promotion. The Six-Party Talks (6PT) is
minimally institutionalized because , although the issue of nuclear
disarmament of N orth Korea is important to China, there 也.e many
heavy players with their own agenda in the forum (U.S. , Japan , and
Russia) , North Korea itself is a maverick, and the participants have yet
to completely agree on what they should do to induce North Korea to
give up its nuclear weapons program. The semi-institutionalized
"Shanghai hezuo zuzhi - weiyi吼叫 Meiguo shili jieru de guoji zuzhi ," (“ Shanghai
Cooperation Organization - the only international organization without the intrusion of
United States power,") 15 June 2005 , http ://www.s ina.com.cn
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character of the ASEAN + 3 re f1 ects the consultative nature of the
forum that leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and China, Japan and South Korea have decided upon , and
competition for in f1 uence between China and Japan. To increase
cooperation with ASEAN without the presence of foreign power丸
China has worked towards institutionalizing a separate China-ASEAN
axis within the rubric of ASEAN + 3.
There seems to have been much agreement among scholars in the field
of integration studies that increasing the number of participants in a
multilateral institution will lead to a decrease in its effectiveness , with
more players pursuing their own agenda within the group , increasing
transaction costs , and complicating the lines of communication. 84 Yet ,
increasing the number of parties in the talks on North Korean nuclear
disarmament from four to six did not seem to have increased or
decreased the effectiveness of the forum in moving it closer to finding a
resolution. By expanding its membership from five to six with the
addition of Uzbekistan , the transformation of the Shanghai-5 into the
SCO actually saw more measures of institutionalization being put in
place. When China dealt with ASEAN in a more bilateral fashion by
pushing cooperation in the 10+ 1 within the rubric of the 10+3 , the
number of countries involved obviously went down-, but the efficacy of
this sub-grouping seems to be higher than the larger forum. Of course ,
it will be hard to predict the future effectiveness of the 10+3 when it
turns into the East Asian Community in December 2005 with the
addition of lndia , Australia , and New Zealand , or that of the SCO , with
the admission of Mongolia, lran , Pakistan and India as observers.
There exists a minority view that multilateral institutions that start out
small wi lI tend to develop a deeper web of cooperation than those that
start out with many members , if the cooperative norms of behavior are
alread y well-established by the initial players and adhered to by the
new-comers. 85 Indeed , there is some support for this contention ,
looking at the expansion of the 4PT into the 6PT , the Shanghai-5 into
Huntingto n , Political Order. 22. Tae-h yo Kim , “ The Six-Way Multilateral Approach
Dilemma for EveηI Party." Korea and World Affai內 ， Vo\. 27 NO .3 (1 07) 2003 , 35 3
85 George W. Downs ‘ Dav id M. Rocke. and Peter N . Barsoom , ,‘ Managing the Evo luti on
of Multilateralism ," lnternational Organization 52:2 (Spring 1998 )可 397-419
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the SCO , and ASEAN into the 10+3/1 0+ 1, which saw the broadening
and deepening of institutionalization measures. However , this
postulation cannot explain the differences in the degree of
institutionalization among these forums in which China played a , if not
the , leading role. Neither, it seems , can China's apparent equal
enthusiasm in promoting both regional multilateral security forums,
such as the 6PT and SCO , or economic ones , such as the ASEAN+ 3
and ASEAN+ 1.
East Asian regionalism has been criticized by many observers for
lacking a country that is ready and able to play a leadership role in
overriding structural difficulties and resolving differences of opinion in
integrating the region. China is apparently willing to bear the cost of
leading the drive for greater institutionalization in Asian regional
organizations because , as compared to reaping the benefits of raising its
international status and securing a peaceful and stable external
environment for continuing its economic growth , the price tag of
leadership , such as hosting and setting the agenda for 6PTs , opening up
its market to agricultural imports 企om the poorest Southeast Asian
countries with very low or no tariffs , or budgeting for a secretariat and
its permanent staff for the SCO , is really quite low and can be kept
relatively well-hidden for a large and authoritarian country like China.
As well , the states of Southeast Asia and Central Asia are still
concerned with keeping their sovereign independence by subscribing to
the principle of non-interference in the affairs of neighboring states ,
and to the extent that this thinking is shared by China , pursuing
cooperative security and functional interdependence with China could
pose very little risk to the other Asian states.
This is not the place to discuss whether China ' s multilateral diplomacy
is a carefully cultivated effort to advance national interests by
“reassun:時 those who might collaborate against a putative China
threat ,,, 86 or a genuine conversion to cooperative definitions of national
security socialized by the experience of participating in multilateral
的 A very Goldstein,“ An Emerging China's Emerging Grand Strategy, A Neo-Bismarkian
Turn?" in lnternational R e lations η7e 01y and the Asia-Pac叭c‘ ed. G. John lkenberry and
Michael Mastanduno (N ew York: Co\umbia University Press, 2003)‘ 73 .
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organizations. As China scholar Susan Shirk has noted , realpolitick
pursuit of national interest does not preclude an idealist commitment to
the values of multilateralism , as was the case of the U.S. after World
War II , which was able to convince other states that it would not
threaten them by creating !p-ultilateral global institutions and submitting
itself to their authority.OI Suffice to note that China's enthusiasm
toward crafting , sustaining and deepening regional multilateral
institutions has only waxed urunitigated.
In Asia , the challenge is to deepen multilateral negotiations and build
institutions. However , institutionalization of the Asian regional
multilateral processes , in many ways led by China, faces two major
limitations. Firstly , no one in Asia is seriously contemplating any
schemes for a customs union or common currency , let alone political
federation on the scale of the European Union , given the vast
differences in the history , culture , and institutions of regional countries.
Secondly , the proliferation of bilateral trading arrangements in East
Asia , with its “ spaghetti bow 1 effect with different rules and
regulations," may lead to an “ interlocking web of FTAs in the region,"
oo
but may also hinder the process of regional integration.
To the extent that China is pushing for the institutionalization of
regional multilateral processes , the scope of its achievement has been
shown to be limited by two primary considerations - distribution of
power among the forum participants and whether the major players are
friendly towards China or not so , which showed up China's influence
relative to the other members; and the imp 0l1ance of the issues that the
specific forum is set up to deal with , which shows up the relevance and
saliency of China ' s proposals to itself and participating countries.
Whether China's institutionalization objectives can transcend these
realist constraints remains to be seen.
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Appendix
Table of Comparative Institutionalization
6PT

10+3
President meeting
(x1)

Vice President meeting
坐坐
Premier meeting
(x6) I Premier meetin

Hos t: PRC Beijing
I 10+3 Unit established
I Secretariat
State Guest House I within ASEAN Secretariat I RATS
Chairman 's post-talk I ASEAN TAC signatory
I Cha 巾 r
Statement
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6PT
Meeting of Ministers

10+3
Meeting of Ministers (12 Forums)

-Level of Vice/Deputy
Foreign Minister
Till July 2005
(4x)
(Irregular)

-Foreign Affairs
Till July 2005

(6x)

-Economics
Till September 2004

(7x)

-Finance
Till May 2005

(8x)

-Agriculture and Forestry
Till October 2004
(4x)
-Labor
Till May 2004

(4x)

sco
Meeting of Ministers
- Foreign Affairs
Till June 2005
(3 extraordina 叩)
- Defense
Till May 2002

(2x)

-Culture
Till April 2002

(1x)

-Economy and Trade
Till September 2003 (2x)
-Transpo 吋

Till Sept 2003
-Tourism
Till January 2005

(4x)

-Environmental
Till October 2004

(3x)

-Health
Till April 2004

(1x)

-Information and Communications
Technology
Till August 2004
(1x)
-Social Welfare and Development
Till December 2004
(1x)
-Transnational Crime Meeting
Till August 2005
(2x)
-Energy Ministers meeting
Till July 2005
(2x)
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(8x)

(2x)

6PT
Meetings of Working
Group Heads
Head or Deputy Head
of Bureau in Foreign
Minist巾 ， position
below level of Deputy /
Vice Foreign Minister

10+3
Meetings of Senior Officials
Senior Officials Meeting on
Transnational Crime

SCO
Meetings of Department
Heads
Meeting of Heads of lawenforcement bodies and
security services
(Bishkek Group)
(2x)
Till May 2002

ASEAN + 3 Senior Health
Officials Meeting on SARS held
from 8 to 9 June 2003

Meeting of Heads of
Departments on
situations and
liquidations of
consequences of
elemental acts
(1x)
Till April 2002

Special Senior Labour Officials
Meeting on SARS in early July
2003

Meeting of General
Public Prosecutors
Till September 2003 (2x)

Senior Officials Meeting on
Energy (Energy Policy Working
Group)
Till July 2003
(2x)
Senior Officials Meeting on
“ Creative Management for
Governmen t" May 26 , 2005

Meeting of the Council of
National Coordinators
Till April 2004
(14x)

Meeting of RATS Council
Till March 2005
(4x)
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